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USURY IN GREEK, ROMAN AND RABBINIC THOUGHT
By ROBERT P. MALONEY, CM.
The Christian teaching on usury did not develop in a vacuum. Christianity was born in a Semitic milieu and spread rapidly through the Graeco-Roman world. Naturally, its ancestry and its environment influenced its moral think ing. The Fathers of the Church were well acquainted with the thought of others about usury. Besides many references to the clear Old Testament usury prohibition, the writings of the Fathers reflect and interact with attitudes toward interest-taking in Greece and Rome and in early rabbinical literature. It will thus be helpful to examine those strains of thought that existed side by side with the early patristic teaching and influenced it.
I. Greek Attitudes Toward Usury
Lending was very common in ancient Greece. Taking interest was a fact of life, though never a universally approved one. Thriving land and sea com merce provided expanding markets for the moneylender's wares. It seemed quite legitimate to most Greek citizens that the lender should share in the increased productivity his loan caused, especially when he risked his money in the process.1 Even if at times the professional money-lender's reputation suffered (often deservedly),2 citizens put him in a class different from that of the honest man who lent as a service to the community rather than hoard his own capital. Orators proclaimed the public usefulness of loans at reason able interest-rates as a means for feeding trade.3 The courts were severe with fraudulent debtors.4
By the end of the fifth century before Christ, banking was a growing con cern in Athens. Inventories of legacies and lawsuits in the middle of the fourth century show fortunes invested entirely in loans.5 Aeschines the phi losopher kept his perfume-works in business by borrowing. Pantaenetos and Mantitheos ran mines with the help of the moneylenders.6 Lending at interest was so commonly accepted at Athens that the popular debtors which dotted Roman history are generally lacking in Greeks saw loans made for commercial reasons as an elemen prosperity. An unknown contemporary of Demosthenes ( for example, writes:8 . . . the resources required by those who engage in trade c those who borrow, but from those who lend; and neither ship n nor passenger can put to sea, if you take away the part contr who lend. In the laws there are many excellent provisions fo tion. It is your duty to show that you aid the laws in ri and that you make no concession to wrongdoers, in order t derive the greatest possible benefit from your market.
Two types of loans at interest existed: ordinary (or terrestria The first involved only the single danger of insolvency; ev greatly attenuated by pledges. The second involved all the dan world shipping, so that naturally its rate of interest was high It is practically certain that the principle of unrestricted libe rates prevailed throughout Greek history.10 A decree at De terest to 6% seems only a temporary revolutionary phen general attitude was laissez faire. The ordinary rate of interest, paid on a monthly basis, year (one drachma per mina).12 A 10% rate was considered a fav and commercial loans were offered at 16% and 18 %,14 while had rates of 20%, 40%, 60% and even 100 %15 depending on w was, the destination of the ships, and the political and econ
Maritime loans often took the form of bottomry bonds, so tha as security.16 In case of shipwreck, the borrower owed not terest nor principal; as a result, the creditor ran an even great debtor. This helps account for the high interest rates. For from the Bosphorus to Piraeus in wartime, creditors aske trip took just a few days. For a round-trip over the same r of scraping together an ?ranos. The comic poets, the orators an all paint scenes depicting this burdensome job.27 Little is known of the legal formalities surrounding the ?ra itor certainly received his money back, without interest, stallments. It also seems certain that the ?ranos gave rise to a tion28 which could be pressed in court (though Plato would n this).29
The ?ranos was a constant practice throughout the Athenian period. It enjoyed high honor since the creditor parted with something which could be useful to him and which he might never receive back. Because of its eco nomic advantages for the debtor, it was always seen as preferable to the loan at interest and was continually held in greater esteem.
(2) Reactions to Abuses. Greed consistently awakens adverse public reac tion. In Athens orators scorned it, playwrights satirized it, and philosophers condemned it. Especially odious was the greed of the public money-lender, which tended to reduce the debtor to privation or even slavery. Bemoaning the greed that corrupted Athens, Demosthenes placed the following lament in the mouth of Solon, the reformer-hero of the debt-ridden poor:30 ... all borrowing was on the security of the debtor's person down to the time of Solon: it was he who first became head of the People. Thus the most grievous and bitter thing in the state of public affairs for the masses was their slavery; not that they were not discontented about everything else, for they found themselves virtually without a share in anything.
He continues later on:36 . . . the three most democratic features in Solon's constitution seem to be these: first and most important, the prohibition of loans secured upon the person; secondly, the liberty allowed to anybody who wished to exact redress on behalf of injured persons; and third, what is said to have been the chief basis of the powers of the multitude, the right of appeal to the jury-court . . . With Solon's reform one of the greatest abuses involved in money lending was eliminated. But others remained. Anatocism, the practice of taking interest on interest (easily manipulated by adding the unpaid interest to the unpaid capital and using the sum as the base for the next interest payment), aroused strong public resentment,37 though probably not to the extent of provoking a legal prohibition, as was later enacted in Rome.38 Plutarch, whose general attitude toward lending at interest is a bit ambig uous, warns his fellow citizens not to borrow lightly, whether they be rich (because then they do not need to borrow) or poor (because then they will be unable to repay). He asks what good Solon had done for the Athenians when he put an end to giving one's person as security for a debt, if debtors are still slaves to those who ruin them and moneylenders still make the market place a place of the damned:39
As Darius sent Datis and Artaphernes against Athens with chains and fetters in their hands for their captives, in similar fashion these men, bring ing against Greece jars full of signatures and notes as fetters, march against and through the cities, not . . . sowing beneficent grain, but of debts, roots productive of much toil and much inter escape from, which, as they sprout and shoot up round ab and strangle the cities.
Plutarch also highlights another of the practices that aroused opposition in Greece, immediate discount of interest from th tracting the interest from the capital even before handing it o debtor actually paid for what he never received):40
They say that hares at one and the same time give birth suckle another, and conceive again; but the loans of these ba give birth to interest before conception; for while they ar immediately demand payment, while they lay money down t and they lend what they receive for money lent.
While se'zure of person disappeared after Solon, the fear of pr remained to plague the debtor as the dreaded first of the mo In Nubes, Aristophanes pictures Strepsiades' sleepless night the coming moneylender:41 But I can't sleep a wink, devoured and bitten By ticks, and bugbears, duns, and race-horses, All through this son of mine. He curls his hai While public opinion clearly opposed the greedy practices of the money lenders, in general the citizens of Greece always recognized the legitimacy of normal interest and the usefulness of loans at interest for the welfare of the city-state.43 Pseudo-Demosthenes reflects both the opposition to abuse and the approval of legitimate practice in the oration In Pantaenetum:u I, for my part, do not regard a moneylender as a wrongdoer, although certain of the class may justly be detested by you, seeing that they make a trade of it, and have no thought of pity or of anything else, except gain. Since I have myself often borrowed money, and not merely lent it to the plaintiff, I know these people well; and I do not like them either; but, by Zeus, I do not defraud them, nor bring malicious charges against them. But if a man has done business as I have, going to sea on perilous journeys, and from his small profits has made these loans, wishing not only to confer favors, but to present his money from slipping through his fingers without his knowing it, why should one set him down in that class ? ? unless you mean this, that anyone who lends money to you ought to be detested by the public.
(3) The Philosophers. The most clear-cut opposition to interest-taking in Greece was philosophical. Plato and Aristotle both condemned the practice.
Yet loans at interest were so widely recognized as integral to Athenian eco nomic life that the voices of the great philosophers went largely unheard. There is a temptation (into which several important modern works on usury have fallen)45 to dismiss Plato's statements on the subject as musings on an ideal republic; the inference is that Plato could hardly have intended such impractical reflections as applicable to the real world. But this is to mis understand Greek political theory. In ancient Greece political theory was a practical science. It dealt with matters which could be otherwise. Philosophers felt themselves charged with the duty of showing how things might be otherwise ? and better.46 Their political theory was idealistic, yet practical. It envisioned ideal states, yet states which were meant to be realized. Plato actually attempted to put the ideal into practice in his ill-fated venture at Syracuse.
Both Plato and Aristotle held up the independent city-state as their ideal.47 They sought to rescue the city state from the intellectual and moral corruption 43 The words in general must be used to qualify this statement. As will be seen, there were exceptions to this general attitude. In Sparta, moreover, interest taking was ap parently forbidden as part of a larger isolationist policy that abhorred money and commerce.
Unfortunately most information concerning Sparta comes from Athenian sources; there are almost no extant indigenous sources. Plato aimed to form citizens mutually interested in one another. He eliminate traffic in gold and silver as the source of selfishness and strife. He believed that the lawmaker's job was to establish an order where the good was th supreme value; consequently, the Leges put aside what his society considered the ordinary means of commercial growth and fortune. But this ideal schem never took root in the real world of Athens.
Aristotle, like Plato, was far from unconscious of the real-world situation.
He examined that situation philosophically and condemned it. The co demnation is really quite amazing when viewed in its context. Aristotle wrote at the dawn of a new era. His pupil Alexander was to establish a world empire that would make the self-sufficient city-state a thing of the past In Athens commerce with other states had long been a thriving enterprise.
Usury was an everyday affair. Yet Aristotle condemned it. Moneymaking, for Aristotle, is certainly a necessary art; it is part of man aging a household. But if it becomes the end of life, if it knows no bounds and turns even to unnatural practices to satisfy its excessive desires, it is plainly contrary to man's true good. Interest-taking is a prime example:55
Of the two sorts of moneymaking, one, as I have just said, is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, the latter a kind of exchange which is justly censured;
for it is unnatural and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term usury ( ), which means the birth of money from money, is ap plied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of making money this is the most unnatural.
Aristotle's position is clear. He condemns usury uncompromisingly as contrary to nature. He starts from a limited concept of money as a medium of exchange and envisions no other natural usage. Attempts to employ money in a way contrary to its nature are wrong. This position, while uncompromis ing, was also rather isolated in commercial Athens.
Aristotle places moneylending among the most despicable occupations.
The usurer, because of greed, attempts to make a profit from what is naturally sterile and purely a medium of exchange. Discussing ' meanness ' in the Ethica Nichomachea, Aristotle distinguishes those who are mean because of deficiency in giving and those who are mean because of excess in getting. In the latter category he lists the moneylender along with other unsavory characters.56
The other sort of people are those who exceed in respect of getting, taking from every source and all they can; such are those who follow degrading trades, brothelkeepers and all people of that sort, and petty usurers who lend money in small sums at a high rate of interest; all these take from wrong sources, and more than their due. 
II. Roman Attitudes Toward Usury
Romans, like Greeks, regarded loans at interest as a fact of l was an element in the general prosperity of Greece brought m to Rome.58 Whereas in Greece loans at interest served primar commercial enterprises, in Rome they served to supply th of small farmers, to satisfy previous debts and to pay trib of the debtor was tragic in the first centuries of the Republi unscrupulous practices of the ruling patricians. As late as 3 had power over the person of the debtor,59 whom they could to death if he failed to satisfy them. While Roman literature castigated the greedy usurer, it ra the legitimacy of interest taking.60 Even those who were sev did not themselves hesitate to be lenders.61 The state sought plight of debtors through a whole series of varied enactments Tables to the Codex Justinianus; its efforts The curse of usury, it must be owned, is inveterate in Rome, a constant source of sedition and discord; and attempts were accordingly made to repress it even in an older and less corrupt society. First came a provision of the Twelve Tablets that the rate of interest, previously governed by the fancy of the rich, should not exceed unciario faenore; later a tribunician rogation lowered it to one-half of that amount; and at length usufruct was unconditionally banned; while a series of plebiscites strove to meet the frauds which were perpetually repressed, only, by extraordinary evasions, to make their appearance once more.
Unfortunately, Tacitus' account was written long after the events described. Sources from this earlier period are sparse, so that many details are not clear.
The first 64 The exact rate of interest is not especially relevant to the topic under discussion. For a detailed presentation of the various opinions, cf. Caillemer-Baudry DS 2.1224 f., and especially Klingm?ller's outstanding article 'Fenus' in RE2 6.2187-205; cf. 2189-92. 65 Caillemer-Baudry 1224. An anual rate of 1% could hardly have brought about the huge social unrest that usury caused in Rome. On the other hand, a rate of 100% is so oppressive that it is difficult to imagine how both Tacitus and Livy could consider it an improvement of the debtor's lot (cf. Tacitus, Annales 6.16; Livy, 7.16). An opportunity for innovation was presented by the enormous load of debt, which the plebs could have no hope of lightening but by placing their representatives in the highest offices. They therefore argued that they must gird themselves to think of this: with toil and effort the plebeians had already advanced so far that it was in their power, if they continued to exert themselves, to reach the highest ground, and to equal the patri cians in honors as well as in worth. For the present it was resolved that Gaius Licinius and Lucius Sextius should be elected tribunes of the plebs, a magistracy in which they might open for themselves a way to the other distinctions. Once elected, they proposed only such measures as abated the influence of the patricians, while forwarding the interest of the plebs. One of these had to do with debt, providing that what had been paid as interest should be deducted from the original sum, and the remainder discharged in three annual installments of equal size.
While the Lex Licinia Sestia aimed to reduce the debtor's burden by cut ting his payments and spreading them out, a law in 347, the second of those mentioned above in Tacitus' Annales, reduced the interest-rate. Livy gives the details:69
The same peaceful conditions continued at home and abroad during the consulship of Titus Manlius Torquatus and Gaius Plautius. But the rate of interest was cut in half (semiunciarium tantum ex unciario fenus factum), and debts were made payable, one-fourth down and the remainder in three annual installments; even so some of the plebeians were distressed, but the public credit was of greater concern to the senate than were the hardships of single persons.
By 347, then, the legal rate o? interest had sunk to 4 1/6% or 5%. Livy's account reflects a political movement seeking to alleviate the debtor's misery through legal action. The movement culminated in the complete abolition of usury.
The Lex Genucia (342), the third of those mentioned above in Tacitus'
Annales, prohibited usury altogether. Livy mentions the prohibition briefly:70
In addition to these transactions, I find in certain writers that Lucius Genucius, a tribune of the plebs, proposed to the plebs that it should be unlawful to lend at interest.
The law seems to have had little lasting practical effect. As a matter of fact, its very existence has been contested71 because it fits in so poorly with what we know of the conditions of the time. But that the law did exist seems cer tain (besides Livy, it is very well attested in Tacitus and Appian).72 On the 69 Livy 7.27.3 (Loeb transi.). 70 Livy 7.42.1 (Loeb transi.).
71 Klingm?ller 2192-3. 72 Tacitus, Ann. 6.16; Appi?n, Bella ciuilia 1.54. The Lex Marcia, probably from the same period, also gave the debtor legal action against the usurer. Gaius, Institutiones. 4.23, relates; 'Other statutes, however, set up procedure by manus iniectio, . . . the L.
other hand, it also seems certain that it was honored more in the breach than in the keeping. The lawmaker had tried, and failed, to eliminate what was already a necessary part of the Roman economy.73
While much of the data from this early period of Roman history is frag mentary and details are meager, it is rather clear that the laws concerning interest-taking were generally not obeyed,74 as was the case with the Lex Genucia. The legal rate of interest was regarded more as a minimum than a maximum. Exorbitant rates sowed seeds of discord. Popular uprisings resulted, and several times the plebeians refused to fight in Roman wars unless something were done about the condition of debtors.75 Reform legis lation ordinarily followed the outbreak of public hostility, but only to be met with general disregard by the moneylenders. The problem of the debt-ridden poor would plague Rome throughout its entire history.
Legal prohibitions could easily be eluded. Creditors could lend through the Latins, whom Roman Law did not generally touch (just as in Greece the Metics were often used to circumvent burdensome prescriptions). Na turally, creditors took advantage of the legal loopholes. The Lex Sempronia (193) attempted to check abuses by making the Latins declare all debts in which they had an interest.76
Other laws focused more directly on the debtors' unsolved problems. The Lex Flaminia minus solvendi (217) allowed borrowers to pay off their debts with money of reduced value.77 In 88 b.c. the Lex Cornelia returned to the rate of interest set by the Twelve Tablets.78 The Lex Valeria (86) allowed bankrupt debtors to satisfy their creditors by repaying one-fourth of what they owed.79
Shortly after this time, as commerce with Greece and Asia Minor increased, the Romans began to adopt the long standing Greek practice of 1% a month (12% a year) as the rate of interest on loans. Around the year 71, Lucullus made this the maximum rate for Asia and Cilicia.80 As in Greece, the rate for maritime loans remained completely free. Cicero imitated Lucullus' Marcia against usurers provided that if they had exacted interest, proceedings by manus iniectio should be taken against them for repayment* (de Zulueta transi. The bystanders all declared that the conduct of Scaptius w in refusing 12 percent with compound interest. Others said He seemed to me to be more of a knave than a fool: for eit content with 12 percent on good security, or he hoped for very doubtful security.
How huge interest payments could get becomes evident fr Cicero's accounts:87
Pompey has more influence than anyone for many reason it is rumored that he will come to conduct the war against Even to him, however, payment is made on the following te thirtieth day some ?8000 is paid and that by tribute impose subjects. Even such a sum will not cover the amount of mon However, our friend Gnaeus [Pompey] is an easygoing c willing to forgo his capital and is content with interest, an full. The king pays no one else and has no means to pay. H sury and no regular tribute: he levies taxes on the method are scarcely sufficient to pay the interest on Pompey's mon While 12% remained the legal maximum for centuries, ra place to place. Lower rates, 6% for example, were quite commo was good.88 As ever, higher rates were common too. Other attempts at restricting interest more generally took place. The
Emperor Constantine issued a very specific decree on April 17, 325:91 If a person should lend farm products, either liquid or dry, to those who need them, he shall receive a third additional part as interest; that is, if the sum credited should be two measures, he shall gain a third addi tional measure. I. But if, on account of the advantage of the interest, a creditor should refuse to accept payment of the debt when he is formally notified, he shall be deprived not only of the interest but also of the prin cipal of the debt. II. This law shall pertain to farm produce only, for a credi tor is forbidden to receive more than one per cent for money lent on interest.
A series of laws aimed at viri illustres. Alexander Severus (222-235) pro hibited senators from taking interest, but allowed them gratuities.92 Severus* law was soon set aside by another permitting senators 6%.93 In 397 stricter voices prevailed, and senators were again forbidden to take interest.94 They easily evaded the law by making loans in the name of a minor son, so in 405 the emperors Arcadius and Honorius returned to the more moderate position of allowing senators 6%.95
Abuses continued to arouse legal reaction. Anatocism, which had awakened adverse public sentiment in Greece without being formally prohibited, was forbidden at least in some cases in Rome.96 A very important reform law put a ceiling on the accumulation of interest, so that it could not mount higher than the capital.97 In 284 Diocletian imposed the penalty of infamy on those who took illegal interest.98 In 386 Theodosius the Great decreed that usurers must pay a penalty of fourfold the amount of illegal interest that they had taken:99 Theodosius, while recognizing the importance of credit transactions an protecting them legally, shows a distinct dislike for greedy creditors. In law of June 17, 380, providing for penalties if a debtor still refuses to pay eve after a legal judgment has been handed down against him, the emperor writes:100
Of course, provision must be made on the other hand also against the If by every possible kind of humanity it behooves the public sympathy to make wise provision, either in specific cases or in general, for the af flicted fortunes of the Africans, who have been compelled to lose all their resources through very bitter sufferings, how much more fitting it is that their misfortunes should be alleviated by the remedies of Our Clemency against the wicked molestations of their creditors 1 . . . For the same reason of justice, it must also be observed that absolutely no interest for any period of time shall be demanded for money that has been lent to those persons whose misfortunes have been stated above, since it ought to b more than enough for the creditors if, after the restoration of the situation, they can attain the principal of the debt.
Justinian (483-565)102 renovated the whole legal treatment of loans at in terest, incorporating much previous legislation into his Corpus and showing far reaching kindness toward the debtor. Without going so far as to sup press interest-taking, as ecclesiastical prohibitions might have suggested,103 he reduced the rate of interest to 6% for ordinary loans and even to 4% if the lender was a persona illustris. Those involved in commercial transactions could ask 8%. For maritime loans and loans of produce (where terms wer often shorter and risks were greater), 12% or 12 1/2% was permitted.104 Jus tinian again forbade that interest mount higher than capital,105 and he strength ened the law against anatocism.106
He shows the same hostility toward greedy creditors that was seen in Theo dosius. In one of his Novell??, limiting the rate of interest to 12 1 /2% on farm produce, he writes:107
We have considered it advisable to correct a most atrocious and inhuman abuse which is far worse than any act of impiety or avarice, and administer a remedy applicable to all persons, not only in this present time of necessity, but throughout all future ages; for it has come to Our ears that certain persons, in the province which you govern [i.e. Thrace], being induced by avarice to take advantage of the public distress, and, having drawn up agreements bearing interest, by which they loaned a small amount of grain, have seized the lands of the debtors, and that, for this reason, some farmers have fled and concealed themselves, others have died of starvation, and pestilence, not less terrible than a barbarian invasion, has, in consequence of the failure of the crops, afflicted the people. Hence we order that all creditors of this kind, no matter what may be the value of the articles which they have loaned . . . shall hereafter be entitled to receive annual interest on such articles at the rate of the eighth part of a measure for each measure furnished, and must return to the farmers the lands which they have taken in pledge . . . This law shall apply to all Our subjects, for it is humane and just, it relieves the poor, and affords adequate compensation to cred itors.
Justinian limited the rate for monetary loans to farmers to 4%108 and those to churches and pious foundations to 3%.109 In general, a practical concern for the poor marked his legal enactments on usury.
To sum up, interest taking was generally accepted in Rome as it had been in Greece, but here it caused suffering and political unrest among the poor. From the time of the Twelve Tables, legislation sought to limit interest and aid the poor. Numerous laws over the centuries allowed various restrictive rates; for the most part the laws were ineffective. In the first century b.c. the Greek practice (12%) was adopted for ordinary loans, but maritime loans remained free. 
III. Early Rabbinical Attitudes Toward Usury
In the early centuries of the Christian era, as the Father were beginning to comment on the practice of usury, Jew not silent. The ideas that were in circulation in the Palesti another not only in the East but in the diaspora as well. I therefore, to know more precisely what early Judaism sa imperial law, it was a disaster. In his Prochiron legum, Basil the Ma decreed: 'Even though many emperors before us deigned to allow inter because of the incorrigibility and crassness of creditors, nevertheless we to be repudiated as unworthy of our Christian state because it is prohibi Therefore, Our Majesty decrees that no one has the power to receive int whatsoever, lest, while we seem to keep the law of God, we should tran But if anyone should receive anything anything, let it be imputed as a de (Prochiron legum 16.14, ed. . Brandileone and B. Puntoni [Rome 1895]; Basil's decree caused such havoc that his successor, Leo the Wise (886 (with great delicacy) and set the maximum rate of interest at 4 %. ' Ce excellent and salutary if the human race, being conformed to the laws o had no need for human regulations. Nevertheless as it is not granted up to the heights of the Holy Spirit and to hear the echo of the divin there are very few who arrive there through the practice of virtue, w happy if men at least live conformably to human laws. The judgment condemns in an absolute fashion what is called interest on loans of mo that, the Emperor of eternal memory, our father, decided to forbid, by the receiving of interest. But that prohibition became, because of extrem not of betterment, as was the legislator's aim, but of perversion . . . ' those who would formerly have lent to the poor, because they could no from their loans, became hard and inhuman toward those who needed same problem in Dt. 15.3 f and in ShebVit X 3-5). Moreover, the law l because of the perversity of human nature, to increased misery. Leo c wanting to condemn the law in itself (something which would not pl (as I have said) that human nature cannot attain the sublimity of the this enactment which was too perfect, and we permit, on the contra practice of loans of money at interest, as the ancient legislators had au Talmudic legislation far outdid the Old Testament in discouraging loans at interest. The Jew was to lend freely, asking no interest.111 Taking this a step further, the rabbi Gamaliel TI (T2)112 even made it a practice to take losses on his loans, accepting reimbursement at whichever price level was lower, that of the time of lending or of repayment.113 Laws forbade not just usury, but even what looked like usury.114 Numerous cases were examined and were answered with a severity that went far beyond the biblical prohibition. As in Old Testament times, however, many did break both the letter and the spirit of the law.115 Interest taking still went on. The permission to take interest from the gentiles remained;116 some, as will be seen, even saw it as a command.117
The 24 % rate in Egypt of Hellenistic and Roman times and the 50 % penalty for failure to pay on time were a strong incentive either to break the prohibi tion against usury or to circumvent it through short-term loans with high penalties for defaulting.118
The usury prohibition was one of those laws which concerned only members of the community. It sought to foster community, to strengthen the bonds that gave Israel her identity, to recall to the Israelite that his fellow countrymen were his brothers. When an Israelite was in need, his brethren were to come to his aid. The Mekiltha on Exodus (c. For along with the capital, in place of the interest which they not to accept, they receive a further bonus of the fairest and m things that human life has to give: mercy, neighborliness, ch nanimity, a good report and good fame. And what acquisit these? No, even the Great King will appear as the poorest of pared with a single virtue. For his wealth is soulless, buried d houses and recesses of the earth, but the wealth of virtue lies eign part of the soul, and the purest part of existence, heave all-creating God claim it as their own. Unfortunately, as Deuteronomy had clearly foreseen,123 the p interest-taking discouraged lending. Philo recognized the pro own time and exhorted his readers to generosity:124
He forbids anyone to lend money on interest to a brothe by this name not merely a child of the same parents, but any same citizenship or nation. For he does not think it just to am bred from money as their calves are from cattle. And he bids to take this as grounds for holding back or showing unwillin tribute, but without restriction of hand and heart to give free gif who are in need, reflecting that a free gift is in a sense a loan repaid by the recipient when times are better, without comp with a willing heart. 120 BM 71a. The letter J will be placed before the abbreviation of a tra citation is from the Gemara of the Jerusalem Talmud. The commandment has been formulated to show that there is a type of interest which precedes and a type which follows. How? A man is seeking to borrow from someone and he sends him a present saying, '... so that you might lend to me. ' That is interest which precedes. A man has borrowed from someone and sends him small coins and a present, saying, '... for your inactive money which I have. ' That is interest which follows.
The extension of the usury prohibition is especially clear in the fifth chapter of Baba MezVa (M).128 The term usury takes on a very broad meaning here so that rather common commercial activities fall under the prohibition.129
The chapter gives too many cases to list them exhaustively, but some of the details are interesting as examples of how broad the meaning of usury had become.
The creditor may not dwell without charge in the debtor's courtyard or hire it from him at a reduced rate, since that counts as usury.130 If a man sold his field and was given a part of the price and said to the buyer, ' Pay me (the rest of) the price when you will, and then take what is yours/ this is forbidden.131 125 The Talmud and other Jewish writings distinguish four main types of increase': CO SfSISp *1> or fixed interest; (2) t?^Sl p58 or 'the mere dust of interest': (3) ^fift fi^OID or <tne semblance of interest'; (4) E 1! ITPSI or interest which is payable by some means other than money. The first of these denotes the ordinary transaction where interest on money is paid directly on a loan. The second denotes some indirect form of interest con nected with bargain or sale, even if given more or less gratuitously by the borrower; it also covers cases where a borrower gives something in anticipation of a loan. The sale of futures was prohibited under this second category. The third type of 'increase' refers to interest paid out of gratitude for a past loan or out of the desire to induce a future one. The fourth includes many disparate cases, as, for example, when a borrower honors his creditor by allowing him to perform some religious duty in connection with synagogue worship. None may set up a shopkeeper on the condition of receiving half the profit, or give him money to buy produce with on the condition of receiving half the profit, unless he is paid his wage as a laborer.132
Even more interesting are the complicated commentaries of the rabbis on Baba MezVa. Through casuistry they refined the meaning of usury eve more than the text of the Mishna had done. Some of their comments will be considered shortly in passing, but only a full reading of the Gemara, which it is impossible to reproduce here, will give an adequate picture of the intri cacies of usury that were discussed within Judaism.133 The Tosephta to Baba MezVa adds case after case involving the broadened concept of usury.134 Again, it forbids not just interest-taking, but what looks like usury, even though granting that it might not be. Baba Bathra further illustrates the lengths to which such an understanding of usury could be car ried. The following discussion from the Gemara involves the subtle use of th usury principle:135
Gome and hear ! It has been taught: In the case where a man hired a laborer to work for him at the harvesting season for a denarius a day, and paid him his wage in advance, but at that season the laborer was worth a seta* a day he must not derive any benefit from it. If, however, a man hires a laborer to commence work at once and to continue through th harvesting season for a denarius a day, although at the harvesting season he was worth a seta , he is permitted to pay in advance and to have the benefit of the difference.
In the first case there is a difference between the salary given and the price of labor; hence there is usury involved, since the laborer is paying a selac in labor for every denarius he has received. In the second case the whole period of the contract is considered as one long day. Since, during the first days of the period, labor was worth only a denarius a day, no higher pric need be paid for the other days; hence no usury is involved. In another case Baba Bathra (G) explicitly refuses to apply the usury prohibition to the recip rocation of wedding gifts, so as to allow a person to give a gift of higher value than the one be received.136
Baba Kamma does apply the broadened concept of usury to sales trans actions. The Gemara states:137
The latter transaction is condemned because it could involve the handing over of a sum of money now in exchange for a larger one later. The Gemara views this as contrary to the spirit of the usury prohibition.
The Mishna carefully lists all those who incur guilt in usurious deals:138
These transgress a negative command: the lender, the borrower, the guarantor, and the witnesses. And the Sages say: The scribe also. They transgress the command ' Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, ' and ' Take thou no usury of him, ' and ' Thou shalt not be to him as a credi tor, ' and ' Neither shall ye lay upon him usury, ' and ' Thou shalt not put a stumbling-block before the blind, but thou shalt fear thy God. I am the Lord. '
Commenting on this text, the Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud points out the blindness of the usurer who hires a notary and witnesses to attest to his sin.139 Similarly the Mekiltha on Exodus condemns everybody who takes part in usury:140
So far I know only of a warning to the lender and to the borrower. But how would I know of a warning to the guarantor, to the witnesses, and to the notary? Therefore it says here: 'Neither shall you lay upon him in terest'? in any capacity at all. In this connection the sages said: He who lends on interest transgresses five commandments, namely: 'Not to give' (Lev. 5.37), 'and not to take' (Lev. 5.36), 'Thou shalt not be to him as a usurer' (Ex. 22.24), 'Neither shall you lay upon him interest' (Ex. 22.24) , and 'nor put a stumbling block before the blind' (Lev. 19.14). And just as the lender and the borrower transgress five commandments, so also do the guarantor and the witnesses and the notary. R. Judah would exempt the notary. R. Meir says: He who lends on interest, saying to the scribe: 'Come and write,' and to the witnesses: 'Come and sign,' has no share in Him who decreed against taking interest.
For further applications of the usury principle in rabbinical writings, there are ample examples in Baba MezVa V, 7 ff., the Tosephta to Baba MezVa 4.4-5 and 9-25, cArakin (M) 9.2-4, and Baba Bathra 87a. All of these texts are available in translation.141 They apply the usury principle to prices, wages, sale of inheritances, partnerships, advance payments, rents, and other trans actions.
In line with its recommendations to lend generously to fellow Israelites and its deep concern over dealings which might even appear usurious, the Talmud exhorts the creditor to great delicacy toward debtors. It warns him not to wound them, nor to seek profit from debts subtly by imposing unfavorable conditions. Rabbi It is quite clear that the practices of Jews who lent to forgeiners were notor ious at a very early date, though this fact has sometimes been disputed.147 In a papyrus from Egypt in a.d. 41, a certain Serapion counsels a young man, Heracleides, to be careful with creditors and not to fall into the hands of the Jews: e a a a .,148
While the law forbade 'iron terms' toward Jews, foreigners.149 This permission refers to the type of a field or flock, demanding that share the profits fro he has made full payment, and where in the meantim all losses. In such a case A's security was like 'iron usury in the broad sense of the rabbis, since was what he had received. Clearly was the owner of the f bought it and bore the burden of all losses, but he w an additional portion of the profits anyway. Such a only if were a foreigner. It is evident from the text that Rabbi Judah (T4) did not see the prohibition as absolute, since to his mind the Torah could permit exceptions. Rabbi Hezekiah's (dates uncertain, seems post Tannaitic) statement reflects the casuistic method that was already present in Deuteronomy and Leviticus and that will play a major role in introducing new insights into the usury question in the late Middle Ages.
But while the rabbinical prohibition against usury is not absolute, it is certainly very grave. Usury is at times made equivalent to denying God. The Gemara of the Babylonian Talmud, BM, quotes Rabbi Jose (T3) as say ing:152 Come and see the blindness of those who lend at interest: . . . get to gether witnesses, a notary, quill and ink, and then write down and seal (a contract): 'So-and-so has denied the God of Israel.'
In almost the same words the Gemara of the Jerusalem Talmud labels interest taking as denial of Yahweh:153
Come and see the blindness of those who lend at interest: if anyone calls another an idolator, an incestuous man or a murderer, the other seeks vengeance on his life; and here is someone who hired a notary and witnesses and says to them, 'Come and testify that he has denied the Omnipresence.' This brings out that everyone who lends at interest denies the Root Prin ciple.
Reading these two texts in the light of the Gemara on Sanh?drin15* and the Tosephta to Aboda Zara155 it is very striking how grave some of the rabbis, at least for homiletic purposes, declared the sin of usury to be. A Jew was permitted to violate the ordinances of the Torah if he were threatened with death, but he was forbidden to do so in cases of idolatry, immorality and blood shed. The text given above from the Jerusalem Talmud alludes to these three special cases and connects usury with idolatry, the most serious of sins. So grave was the prohibition of idolatry that it was regarded as ' equal in weight to the whole Torah. '156 To drive home their general teaching on idolatry the rabbis formed practical regulations which aimed at lessening the likelihood that Jews would be contaminated with pagan practices. To the modern reader their measures might seem extreme, but they worked from the principle that prevention was better than cure. A treatise like Aboda Zara gives flesh to this principle through multiple minute regulations. The Gemara expresses its working philosophy in an aphorism: 'Keep off, we say to a Nazirite: go round the vineyard and come not near to it. '157 Just as the Nazirite could avoid the fruit of the vine by avoiding the vineyard itself, so also could the Jew be pre served from idolatry by being preserved from any idolatrous object. The Tosephta to Aboda Zara applies this principle to usury by forbidding business dealings that involved any money that had formerly been gained from usury.158 The connection of usury with idolatry makes rabbinical efforts to avoid even what looked like usury much more understandable, even though much of what the rabbis recorded is obviously homiletic material containing exaggerated statements aimed at driving the point home.
In the opinion of the rabbis usury was also equivalent to the shedding of blood.159 Frequently Jewish writers upbraided the usurer for his savagery. Philo was particularly outspoken. In his De virtutibus he wrote:160
But there are some who have reached such a pitch of depravity that, when they have no money, they supply food on loan on condition that they receive in return a greater quantity than they gave. It would be a long time before you would catch these people giving a free meal to beg gars since they create famine when they have plenty and abundance and draw a revenue out of the wretches' empty stomachs and as good as measure out food and drink on a balance to make sure that they do not overweight the scale. So then he absolutely commands those who shall be members of his holy commonwealth to discard such methods of profit-making, for these practices show the marks of a slavish and utterly illiberal soul trans formed into savagery and the nature of wild beasts. Now lending money on interest is a blameworthy action, for a person who borrows is not living on a superabundance of means, but is obviously in need, and since he is compelled to pay the interest as well as the capital, he must necessarily be in the utmost straits. And while he thinks he is being benefited by the loan, he is actually like senseless animals suffering further damage from the bait which is set before him. I ask you, Sir Mon eylender, why do you disguise your want of a partner's feeling by pretend ing to act as a partner ? Why do you assume outwardly a kindly and charita ble appearance but display in your actions inhumanity and a savage brutality, exacting more than you lend, sometimes double, reducing the pauper to further depths of poverty? And therefore no one sympathizes when in your eagerness for larger gains you lose your capital as well. In their glee all call you extortioner and money grubber and other similar terms, you who have lain in wait for the misfortunes of others, and regarded their ill luck as your own good luck. It has been said that vice has no sense of sight; so too the moneylender is blind, and has no vision of the time of repayment, when it will hardly be possible, if at all, to obtain what he has expected to gain by his greed. Such a person may well pay the penalty of his avarice . . .
The rabbis looked at the usury prohibition as intimately connected with
Israel's covenant with Yahweh. The Siphra on Leviticus states:162 I, the Lord your God, have brought you out of Egypt on the condition that you accept the commandments on usury. Whoever professes them professes the exodus from Egypt, and vice versa.
From this it followed that the breaking of the prohibition had brought about the subjection of Israel to her enemies, since this was a necessary consequence of unfaithfulness to the covenant. The Gemara of Sukkah draws this conclu sion:163
The possessions of the householders have been delivered to the empire because of four faults: on account of those who retain in their possession bills which have been paid (in the hope of claiming them again); on ac count of those who lend money on usury; on account of those who had the power to protest against wrongdoing and did not protest; and on ac count of those who publicly declare their intention to give specified sums for charity and do not give.
So abhorrent was usury to the rabbis that some remarked that selling one's daughter into slavery was less self defeating than a usurious deal. The Gemara on cArakin records that R. Huna (a.d. 216-297) makes the com parison:164 ... he teaches us that a man should rather sell his daughter than bor row on usury; for in the former case she goes on making deductions and goes out free, whereas here the debt becomes even larger.
The rabbis saw that the daughter's work would count toward the payment of the debt, so that eventually, when the balance was paid, she would be fre again. A loan at interest, on the other hand, would just keep mounting highe and higher and would worsen the debtor's lot rather than improve it.
Considering usury equivalent to robbery, the rabbis excluded the money lender from being a witness or a judge. Sanh?drin (M)165 classes the usurer with the gambler, the pigeon trainer (probably a man who engaged in some form of racing birds or who lured birds from another man's dovecote by mean of decoys), and the trader who carried on operations during the sabbatica year. None of these might be judges or witnesses. The disqualification i based on Ex. 23:1: 'Put not your hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness. ' This text had been applied to robbers and was used to exclude them from the two offices. The rabbis consider all those listed in Sanh?drin as worth of the same treatment.
Like the Old Testament, rabbinic literature did not consider the usury ques tion in terms of justice. As seen in the second chapter, the Old Testamen was concerned with the bond of brotherhood and charity toward the poo in its explanation of the prohibition of usury. Rabbinic writings develop the same ideas. When the question of restitution arose, rabbis disputed whethe or not interest had to be returned, but neither side in the argument argued from considerations of justice. The Gemara of Temurah describes the dispute:16 . . . wherein do Abaye and Raba really differ? ? They differ in the case of stipulated usury [where the creditor arranges for a fixed amount of interest on a loan] . . . For R. Eleazer said: Stipulated usury can be re claimed through the judges, whereas the dust of usury [i.e., indirect usury, as when a man sells his field and says to the buyer that if he pays him at once the price will be so much, but if he pays later, the price will be more] cannot be reclaimed through the judges. R. Johanan, however, says: Even stipulated usury is not reclaimed through the judges. . . . R. Isaac said: What is the reason of R. Johanan? Scripture says: 'He hath given forth upon usury and hath taken increase: shall he then live? He shall not live,' thus intimating that the taking of usury is a matter that affects life but is not subject to restoration. . . . Lenders on interest are com pared to shedders of blood. Just as shedders of blood cannot make res toration of the lives lost, so lenders on interest are not required to make restoration of interest.
The Gemara treats restitution in several other places,167 as does the Tosephta to Baba Mezofa,l?s but perhaps most interesting of all is the discussion in Baba Even though the goods can be identified with certainty, the children of the debtor are excluded from any obligation of restitution because they do not fall under the positive divine command. Such a line of reasoning obviously does not revolve around principles of justice. This is also the case with Rabbi Meir's (T3) opinion. He held the strict view that the usurer should lose everything, principal and interest;172 but Baba Bathra (G)173 makes it clear that this is a case of a penalty imposed on the whole for the sake of its part. Anyway the Sages disagreed with Rabbi Meir174 and demanded only that the interest be given back. But again Baba Bathra (G) calls this a penalty,175 not restitution demanded in justice.
Finally, considering all the intricacies of the restrictions involved in the legislation surrounding loans, it is not difficult to imagine that even the generous i?9BK 94b. The Mishna witnesses that it was a stark reality. But ShebV an attempt to adapt the law to the needs of the times.177 concerning the sabbatical year (cancelling debts) had paralyz Hillel had to enact the law of prozbul by which a creditor coul at any time. The text is very interesting in that it shows the Old Testament law to changing conditions:178
A loan secured by a prozbul is not cancelled. This was one instituted by Hillel the elder; for when he observed people r lending to one another, and thus transgressing what is writt 'Beware, lest there be a base thought in thy heart,' ... he in prozbul. This is the formula of the prozbul: ' I declare before judges of that place, that touching any debt that I may have I shall collect it whenever I desire.' And the judges sign witnesses.
One of the contracts from the caves of Murabba'at provides a recently dis covered example of the prozbul.119 The papyrus is from a.d. 55/56 and con cerns a loan of money. If the loan is not paid on time, the borrower will pay 20% interest as a penalty.180 The creditor retains his right to reimbursement even in the sabbatical year, and if the debtor defaults he may seize his property.
To sum up: contemporary with early Christianity, Talmudic legislation far outdid the Old Testament in discouraging interest taking. Conversely, it strongly emphasized the obligation to lend freely to the poor man. The rabbis at the same time extended the prohibition against usury to much more than interest taking; they forbade even what looked like usury. But permission to take interest from the gentiles remained in effect; some even regarded it as a command. Casuistry, moreover, did provide for interest taking in a few cases even among Jews, so that in practice the prohibition was not absolute. Viola tion of the prohibition was considered very grave; at times it was spoken of as 176 178 Ibid. The usual spelling is VliTTlft? though ^1^01*10 *s not uncommon. The word corresponds formally with the Greek ? but historically it has been difficult to find any meaning of this rather common Greek word which would be applicable to a legal instrument such as the Jewish prozbul. In recent times, however, Greek papyri from Egypt have afforded several instances of a technical juridical usage of ? , so that Like the Old Testament, rabbinic literature did not pose the usury question in terms of justice; it saw it in terms of charity toward the poor, especially where the bond of brotherhood united the poor man with his brethren.
It must be left for another paper to show that the early Christian Church was not unaware of contemporary Jewish writing, and that the Fathers, in particular Clement of Alexandria, Basil, and (through Basil) Ambrose, quote verbatim from the Jewish literature on usury.
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